Thanks for a fascinating tale. Migration can be a wrench. Must be terrible to be caught in the middle with no place that you can really call home. But there have always been intrepid and resourceful types willing to give it a go.
Another fascinating deep look at history and a term that we all know but don’t really understand. Just as a footnote, my understanding is that the Mongolian term хужаа (hujaa), which is a discriminatory term for the Chinese, is derived from 華僑. Ulaanbaatar once had a thriving commercial district, now long gone, where Chinese merchants plied their trade and, of course, exploited the local Mongols economically. It’s generally not a wise idea in Mongolia to advertise your Chinese blood because prejudice runs deep (fuelled by fear of being swamped by the economic and demographic behemoth to the south). Again, congratulations on another indepth view of the history we all think we know.
Yes, the relationship with Mongolia is a fascinating topic that I’ve long wanted to cover. I'm planning to look at it through the lens of the Shanxi merchants 晋商 who dominated that trade, alongside the complex layers of Russian geopolitical influence and the history of its Tibetan Buddhist heritage. However, the full scope of Mongolia's historical relationship with China is something that simply cannot be freely explored or touched in the mainland narrative today.
There are a lot of Chinese nationalists who are braying for Mongolia to be returned to China (or people who more gently say "We would welcome them back"). A previous PRC ambassador to Mongolia once described these people to me as 无聊分子. But whatever you call them, they exist, and are just one of the reasons that Mongolians are leery of China. The Tibetan Buddhist heritage is alive and well in Mongolia -- the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu is still around, and the Dalai Lama is most welcome in Mongolia (he once preached in a large stadium near the airport that was built using Chinese aid). You can almost (ALMOST) feel sympathetic to the Chinese government for the tangled religious and cultural heritage that the Manchus left behind. But the Chinese government wants to have its cake and eat it too. They want everything that the Qing left the Republic (territories and all), minus the Qing model (theoretically at least) of a multi-ethnic state that recognised the existence of Han Chinese along with other independent ethnicities (as exemplified, for instance, in the 五體清文鑒).
I always assumed the Jebtsundamba lineage was entirely severed back in the 1930s. The fact that the succession continues, maintained through the Dalai Lama's recognition, explains why it remains a silent, under-the-radar narrative.
A tangential note: The Chinese penchant for claiming territories that have belonged to it "from time immemorial" also shows up in Mongolia. One Internet comment I read back in the 90s (sorry can't remember the source) claimed that Genghis Khan was "Chinese" because he was born on Khitan-Liao territory. That refers to the fact that the area where he was born theoretically belonged to the Khitan-Liao (which was a northern hybrid dynasty established by nomads related to the Mongols). By that time, however, the Khitan-Liao had completely lost control over the area and it had devolved into a lawless zone of competing warlike interests -- that is the situation that Genghis Khan found himself in and managed to subdue in an almost miraculous fashion by the end of his life. But I couldn't help but find the claim that he was Chinese a vivid illustration of an ingrained habit of finding some kind of Chinese historical territorial claim almost anywhere.
I think the real danger on both sides of this debate is the tendency to project the modern concept of the 'nation-state' backward onto a deeply fluid and tangled history.
Historically, along the Great Wall was never an impermeable barrier; it was a zone of constant movement. Han farmers frequently fled to the grasslands to escape imperial taxation, while nomads settled into agrarian life, creating an ongoing exchange of habits, trade, and culture. A perfect everyday example of this is Shuangyangrou 涮羊肉 mutton hotpot, which is deeply embedded in northern Chinese culinary culture but traces its roots directly to Mongol military traditions. Even today, ethnic Mongols live not just on the steppe, but scattered across northern, western China, and as far south as Yunnan.
Viewed through this lens of fluid cultural inheritance, the current Chinese narrative claiming Genghis Khan isn't actually as absurd as it seems from the outside.
Applying rigid nation-state identities to a historically porous reality is tricky. When we try to draw clean, exclusionary lines of lineage inside a shared, tangled history, we end up creating unnecessary hostility and mutual reductionism.
I hold no brief for Mongolian nationalism -- for instance, their habit of claiming the Hunnu as their historical predecessor (I suspect this derives from the same roots as the Chinese habit of tracing their history in terms of dynasty following dynasty). Mongolia is a rump state, all that is left of the historical Mongolian nation. Their nationalism is highly defensive, featuring a kind of laager mentality ("laager" mentality as a kind of "circling the wagons"). Their nationalism is pretty much Khalkha based. They take pride in the fact that the Khalkha are (supposedly) the Mongolian group that best maintains traditional Mongolian culture. They reject the Mongolian language of the Inner Mongolians. For a long time Mongolians regarded Inner Mongolians as "Chinese"; only more recently have Mongolians become concerned with what's happening in Inner Mongolia. They have little interest in Inner Mongolian music or literature. While they like using the term "Ikh Mongol" (Great Mongolia), their own country is essentially "Baga Mongol" (Small Mongolia). They've lost Buryatia, Inner Mongolia, and other Mongolian regions and there is no longer any prospect of getting them back.
But accepting the Chinese narrative as you do basically plays into the hands of the Chinese state. Applying "rigid nation-state identities to a historically porous reality is tricky". Why so? China does it all the time. "When we try to draw clean, exclusionary lines of lineage inside a shared, tangled history we end up creating unnecessary hostility and mutual reductionism". This is a one-way street. The only country that benefits from this kind of thinking is China, which has a marked propensity to make expansive territorial claims. Other polities in East Asia, particularly Japan ,have managed to keep China at bay because they are geographically insulated. But if your country has been occupied or at any stage been placed under Chinese suzerainty, you will always face the problem that China claims you as its own.
I totally understand. I think that for most Chinese people, they haven't really experienced the benefits of being entirely independent with a singular, clear nation-state identity. From the historical record, attempts at building divided states have usually incurred conflict and war, while a unified status has generally maintained the peace. I think it is a similar underlying tendency to how Europe resolved centuries of conflict between France and Germany, which ultimately led to the formation of the European Union.
There has been some discussion about whether China will eventually divide into several nation-states, and whether that would bring more prosperity to the people living on this land.
Ultimately, the core issue is how to maintain prosperity and peace among divided states, an area where China indeed lacks a Westphalian instinct for diplomacy.
Incidentally, Inner Mongolians who take refuge in Mongolia face a precarious situation. If they continue any kind of pro-independence writing or advocate Inner Mongolian separatism, they are likely to find themselves handed over to the Chinese authorities. Mongolia does not want trouble with China and separatists setting up in Mongolia can only cause them problems.
The Bandung taxonomy working in peacetime and collapsing in crisis is so true. The 1909 law creating millions of people with two nationalities was always going to end badly, but the confirmation that no legal classification actually protected anyone when a state decided to act is brutal. Your face was your dossier. The huaqiao nongchang detail is haunting too.
Arriving in a country that called you its own but couldn't recognize you is the diaspora condition taken to its furthest possible conclusion.
The first time I watched Don't Think I've Forgotten: Cambodia's Lost Rock and Roll, I instantly became a fan of Sinn Sisamouth.
Thank you for bringing up the fate of the Chinese diaspora under the Khmer Rouge. It’s a tragic chapter of history that I don't think has been covered widely enough.
Thank you! This is a fascinating and informative read. I feel like a sponge when I'm reading your posts. Along with several other Substacks by Chinese authors, it's a kind of psychic lifeline for an American like me who spent two decades in the EU and returned in the mid-Nineties to a country slowly going crazy because most of its political elites need enemies to define themselves. There are no utopian societies, but the China of today has way more adults in its government (at all levels from what I can see) with vastly greater competence than the US does. But then our 400 years compared to China's more than 4,000... We're spoiled brats with nuclear weapons and cognitive issues too numerous to list.
Thank you for the kind words, Gordon. Regarding governance, my own view leans toward that every state faces its own profound, often tragic contradictions. I always try to look past the immediate geopolitical narratives to find the human and historical realities underneath. I'm really glad to have you along for the journey.
Thanks for a fascinating tale. Migration can be a wrench. Must be terrible to be caught in the middle with no place that you can really call home. But there have always been intrepid and resourceful types willing to give it a go.
Wow! Fascinating story, thanks much. I'm going to find 给阿嬷的情书...
Another fascinating deep look at history and a term that we all know but don’t really understand. Just as a footnote, my understanding is that the Mongolian term хужаа (hujaa), which is a discriminatory term for the Chinese, is derived from 華僑. Ulaanbaatar once had a thriving commercial district, now long gone, where Chinese merchants plied their trade and, of course, exploited the local Mongols economically. It’s generally not a wise idea in Mongolia to advertise your Chinese blood because prejudice runs deep (fuelled by fear of being swamped by the economic and demographic behemoth to the south). Again, congratulations on another indepth view of the history we all think we know.
Yes, the relationship with Mongolia is a fascinating topic that I’ve long wanted to cover. I'm planning to look at it through the lens of the Shanxi merchants 晋商 who dominated that trade, alongside the complex layers of Russian geopolitical influence and the history of its Tibetan Buddhist heritage. However, the full scope of Mongolia's historical relationship with China is something that simply cannot be freely explored or touched in the mainland narrative today.
There are a lot of Chinese nationalists who are braying for Mongolia to be returned to China (or people who more gently say "We would welcome them back"). A previous PRC ambassador to Mongolia once described these people to me as 无聊分子. But whatever you call them, they exist, and are just one of the reasons that Mongolians are leery of China. The Tibetan Buddhist heritage is alive and well in Mongolia -- the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu is still around, and the Dalai Lama is most welcome in Mongolia (he once preached in a large stadium near the airport that was built using Chinese aid). You can almost (ALMOST) feel sympathetic to the Chinese government for the tangled religious and cultural heritage that the Manchus left behind. But the Chinese government wants to have its cake and eat it too. They want everything that the Qing left the Republic (territories and all), minus the Qing model (theoretically at least) of a multi-ethnic state that recognised the existence of Han Chinese along with other independent ethnicities (as exemplified, for instance, in the 五體清文鑒).
I always assumed the Jebtsundamba lineage was entirely severed back in the 1930s. The fact that the succession continues, maintained through the Dalai Lama's recognition, explains why it remains a silent, under-the-radar narrative.
A tangential note: The Chinese penchant for claiming territories that have belonged to it "from time immemorial" also shows up in Mongolia. One Internet comment I read back in the 90s (sorry can't remember the source) claimed that Genghis Khan was "Chinese" because he was born on Khitan-Liao territory. That refers to the fact that the area where he was born theoretically belonged to the Khitan-Liao (which was a northern hybrid dynasty established by nomads related to the Mongols). By that time, however, the Khitan-Liao had completely lost control over the area and it had devolved into a lawless zone of competing warlike interests -- that is the situation that Genghis Khan found himself in and managed to subdue in an almost miraculous fashion by the end of his life. But I couldn't help but find the claim that he was Chinese a vivid illustration of an ingrained habit of finding some kind of Chinese historical territorial claim almost anywhere.
I think the real danger on both sides of this debate is the tendency to project the modern concept of the 'nation-state' backward onto a deeply fluid and tangled history.
Historically, along the Great Wall was never an impermeable barrier; it was a zone of constant movement. Han farmers frequently fled to the grasslands to escape imperial taxation, while nomads settled into agrarian life, creating an ongoing exchange of habits, trade, and culture. A perfect everyday example of this is Shuangyangrou 涮羊肉 mutton hotpot, which is deeply embedded in northern Chinese culinary culture but traces its roots directly to Mongol military traditions. Even today, ethnic Mongols live not just on the steppe, but scattered across northern, western China, and as far south as Yunnan.
Viewed through this lens of fluid cultural inheritance, the current Chinese narrative claiming Genghis Khan isn't actually as absurd as it seems from the outside.
Applying rigid nation-state identities to a historically porous reality is tricky. When we try to draw clean, exclusionary lines of lineage inside a shared, tangled history, we end up creating unnecessary hostility and mutual reductionism.
I hold no brief for Mongolian nationalism -- for instance, their habit of claiming the Hunnu as their historical predecessor (I suspect this derives from the same roots as the Chinese habit of tracing their history in terms of dynasty following dynasty). Mongolia is a rump state, all that is left of the historical Mongolian nation. Their nationalism is highly defensive, featuring a kind of laager mentality ("laager" mentality as a kind of "circling the wagons"). Their nationalism is pretty much Khalkha based. They take pride in the fact that the Khalkha are (supposedly) the Mongolian group that best maintains traditional Mongolian culture. They reject the Mongolian language of the Inner Mongolians. For a long time Mongolians regarded Inner Mongolians as "Chinese"; only more recently have Mongolians become concerned with what's happening in Inner Mongolia. They have little interest in Inner Mongolian music or literature. While they like using the term "Ikh Mongol" (Great Mongolia), their own country is essentially "Baga Mongol" (Small Mongolia). They've lost Buryatia, Inner Mongolia, and other Mongolian regions and there is no longer any prospect of getting them back.
But accepting the Chinese narrative as you do basically plays into the hands of the Chinese state. Applying "rigid nation-state identities to a historically porous reality is tricky". Why so? China does it all the time. "When we try to draw clean, exclusionary lines of lineage inside a shared, tangled history we end up creating unnecessary hostility and mutual reductionism". This is a one-way street. The only country that benefits from this kind of thinking is China, which has a marked propensity to make expansive territorial claims. Other polities in East Asia, particularly Japan ,have managed to keep China at bay because they are geographically insulated. But if your country has been occupied or at any stage been placed under Chinese suzerainty, you will always face the problem that China claims you as its own.
I totally understand. I think that for most Chinese people, they haven't really experienced the benefits of being entirely independent with a singular, clear nation-state identity. From the historical record, attempts at building divided states have usually incurred conflict and war, while a unified status has generally maintained the peace. I think it is a similar underlying tendency to how Europe resolved centuries of conflict between France and Germany, which ultimately led to the formation of the European Union.
There has been some discussion about whether China will eventually divide into several nation-states, and whether that would bring more prosperity to the people living on this land.
Ultimately, the core issue is how to maintain prosperity and peace among divided states, an area where China indeed lacks a Westphalian instinct for diplomacy.
Incidentally, Inner Mongolians who take refuge in Mongolia face a precarious situation. If they continue any kind of pro-independence writing or advocate Inner Mongolian separatism, they are likely to find themselves handed over to the Chinese authorities. Mongolia does not want trouble with China and separatists setting up in Mongolia can only cause them problems.
The Bandung taxonomy working in peacetime and collapsing in crisis is so true. The 1909 law creating millions of people with two nationalities was always going to end badly, but the confirmation that no legal classification actually protected anyone when a state decided to act is brutal. Your face was your dossier. The huaqiao nongchang detail is haunting too.
Arriving in a country that called you its own but couldn't recognize you is the diaspora condition taken to its furthest possible conclusion.
And then there was Pol Pot’s regime which slaughtered Cambodian Chinese while enjoying international support from PRC.
The first time I watched Don't Think I've Forgotten: Cambodia's Lost Rock and Roll, I instantly became a fan of Sinn Sisamouth.
Thank you for bringing up the fate of the Chinese diaspora under the Khmer Rouge. It’s a tragic chapter of history that I don't think has been covered widely enough.
Thank you! This is a fascinating and informative read. I feel like a sponge when I'm reading your posts. Along with several other Substacks by Chinese authors, it's a kind of psychic lifeline for an American like me who spent two decades in the EU and returned in the mid-Nineties to a country slowly going crazy because most of its political elites need enemies to define themselves. There are no utopian societies, but the China of today has way more adults in its government (at all levels from what I can see) with vastly greater competence than the US does. But then our 400 years compared to China's more than 4,000... We're spoiled brats with nuclear weapons and cognitive issues too numerous to list.
Thank you for the kind words, Gordon. Regarding governance, my own view leans toward that every state faces its own profound, often tragic contradictions. I always try to look past the immediate geopolitical narratives to find the human and historical realities underneath. I'm really glad to have you along for the journey.